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Abstract 
 
One of the most contentious debates today is whether pollution-intensive industries from rich 
countries relocate to poor countries with weaker environmental standards, turning them into “pollution 
havens.”  Empirical studies to date show little evidence to support the pollution haven hypothesis, but 
suffer potentially from omitted variable bias, specification, and measurement errors.  This paper estimates 
the strength of pollution-haven behavior by examining the location choices of equity joint venture (EJV) 
projects in China.  We derive a location choice model from a theoretical framework that incorporates the 
firm’s production and abatement decision, agglomeration and factor abundance.  We estimate conditional 
logit and nested logit models using new data sets containing information on a sample of EJV projects, 
effective environmental levies on water pollution, and estimates of Chinese pollution-intensity for 3-digit 
ISIC industries.  Results from 2,886 manufacturing joint venture projects during 1993-96 show EJVs 
from all source countries go into provinces with high concentrations of foreign investment, relatively 
abundant stocks of skilled workers, concentrations of potential local suppliers, special incentives, and less 
state ownership. Environmental stringency does affect location choice, but not as expected. Low 
environmental levies are a significant attraction only for joint ventures in highly-polluting industries with 
partners from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.  In contrast, joint ventures with partners from OECD 
sources are not attracted by low environmental levies, regardless of the pollution intensity of the industry.  
We discuss the likely role of technological differences in explaining these results. 
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ARE FOREIGN INVESTORS ATTRACTED TO WEAK 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS? 
Evaluating the Evidence from China 
 
I. Introduction  
 
One of the most contentious issues debated today is whether inter-country differences in 
environmental regulations are turning poor countries into “pollution havens.”  The main argument is that 
stringent environmental standards in industrial countries drive firms to close plants at home and establish 
them instead in developing countries, where standards are relatively weaker.  Since more pollution-
intensive industries will have a larger incentive to move, a haven of such industries will build up in poor 
countries.  A corollary is that developing countries may purposely undervalue environmental damage, in 
order to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI).  This, in turn, could generate a “race to the bottom” 
with all countries lowering environmental standards in order to attract and retain investment. 
This study estimates the strength of pollution-haven-seeking behavior by foreign firms investing 
in China.  We derive and estimate a model of FDI location choice in the presence of inter-provincial 
differences in environmental stringency.  Our theoretical framework is built upon Copeland and Taylor’s 
(2003) firm production and abatement decision model, amended to include agglomeration.  From this 
model, we derive an econometric model which is estimated using two new and unique datasets.  The first 
contains information on 2,886 manufacturing foreign equity joint venture (EJV) projects in China during 
1993-96, including provincial location, industry classification, and whether the foreign partner is based in 
Macao, Taiwan or Hong Kong or in a non-ethnic-Chinese industrial (primarily OECD) economy.  The 
second contains information from the annual Chinese environmental and economic censuses.  The 
environmental data allow us to construct effective water pollution levy rates, by province and year, as a 
measure of provincial environmental stringency.  They also include Chinese water-pollution intensities at 
the 3 digit ISIC industry level, as a measure of industrial pollution intensity.  The economic data allow us 
to construct a rich set of provincial characteristics, including agglomeration, potential local suppliers, and 
labor skill shares.   
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Early empirical studies suggested that environmental stringency had no discernible effect on 
location choice.1  Though FDI in pollution-intensive industries did occur, there was little evidence that it 
had been influenced by differing pollution abatement costs, or had flowed faster into developing countries 
relative to industrial countries.2  Recent econometric studies have adopted one of three approaches to 
investigate whether FDI flows have resulted in pollution havens: inter-state plant location choice; inter-
industry FDI flows within a country; and inter-country FDI location choice.  Results from these studies 
are mixed.   
In his review of four studies that use the first approach to study US plant location choice, 
Levinson (1996a) finds little evidence that inter-state differences in environmental regulations affect the 
location of plants in the US.   Levinson (1996b) finds only one of six environmental stringency indicators 
has a significant impact on the location of new branch plants across US states, and its impact is small.  
However, controlling for unobserved state characteristics and adjusting their abatement cost measure for 
inter-state differences in industrial composition, Keller and Levinson (2003) find evidence that pollution 
costs have a moderate deterrent effect on foreign investment into US states. 
 Eskeland and Harrison (2003) adopt the second approach, examining the pattern of foreign 
investment across industries within Mexico, Venezuela, Morocco, and Cote d’Ivoire.  They find that 
abatement costs are not significant determinants of the distribution of foreign investment among 
manufacturing industries within a country.  In addition, the relationship between FDI and pollution-
intensity depends on the pollutant.3  Within an industry, foreign ownership is actually significantly and 
robustly associated with lower energy use (a proxy for lower pollution intensity).   
Smarzynska and Wei (2001) adopt the third approach, evaluating the foreign investment choices 
of multinational firms locating across Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  They emphasize the 
                                                 
1 Reviews of the literature can be found in Dean (1992, 2001) and Copeland and Taylor (2004). 
2 Leonard (1988) found some evidence that governments used lenient environmental regulations to attract FDI in the 
1970s, but he also found that incentives were not substantial enough to offset other determinants of location choice, 
particularly labor productivity, infrastructure and stability.    
3 While there is some evidence of a positive relation between FDI share and air pollution-intensity, there is a 
negative relation between FDI share and both water pollution and toxic-release intensity. 
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problem of omitted variable bias in previous work:  corruption may deter FDI, but may be correlated with 
laxity of environmental controls.  The authors control for the role of corruption, but find little support for 
the hypothesis that lower environmental standards attract investment, or for the hypothesis that lower 
standards are more attractive to pollution-intensive FDI.  However, these results are sensitive to the 
measures chosen to proxy environmental stringency and pollution intensity.4   
Our choice of theory, data, and method attempt to address five problems arising in the recent 
literature. First, as noted by Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) most studies of openness and the 
environment have been loosely motivated by the theoretical literature on pollution emissions and 
abatement, potentially giving rise to specification error.  In response, we use the Copeland and Taylor 
(2003) emission and abatement framework to derive a reduced form estimating equation.  Second, the 
absence of relative factor abundance and agglomeration from many of these studies--critical determinants 
of FDI in China--may cause omitted variable bias. We draw on Zhang and Markusen (1999), Cheng and 
Kwan (2000), and Head and Ries (1996) to incorporate these features into the theoretical framework and 
resulting estimating equation. 
Third, as Smarzynska and Wei (2001) emphasize, many studies have had to rely on highly 
aggregated FDI data, and very broad proxies for environmental stringency or pollution intensity, 
potentially causing measurement error.  In contrast, we have created a panel of FDI projects, allowing us 
to control for the pollution intensity of the activity and for the source of the foreign funding.  The 
availability of provincial effective water pollution levy rates allows us to specify the stringency of 
regulations using a price-based policy instrument at the level of administration.  We thereby avoid the use 
of national proxies (e.g. participation in environmental treaties), which may bear scant relation to actual 
practices, or average abatement costs, which are influenced by local production technologies, factor 
prices, and industry concentrations.   
                                                 
4 Measuring stringency and pollution-intensity by participation in international treaties and an emissions index, the 
authors find dirty projects more likely to locate in areas with low stringency.  However, this result is not robust to 
alternative measures such as actual standards and an abatement index. 
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Fourth, Keller and Levinson (2002) note that unobservable features of a location, such as natural 
resources or sector-specific tax subsidies, may be correlated with both regulatory stringency and 
investment and lead to omitted variable bias.  The direction of the bias cannot be predicted, but it may 
account for the failure of previous studies to find a negative relationship between environmental 
stringency and investment inflows.  We use a number of methods to control for observed and unobserved 
provincial characteristics:  a rich set of control variables;  a nested logit procedure to allow for similarities 
among provinces in the same region; and robustness tests incorporating  regional and provincial fixed 
effects. 
Finally, Ederington, Levinson, and Minier (2003), argue that certain features of an industry allow 
it to respond to greater stringency more dramatically than others.  We expect that firms will respond more 
strongly to inter-provincial differences in pollution taxes, when these taxes represent a significant cost.  
Moreover, we expect that these differences in sensitivity will  occur both between and within industries, if 
abatement efficiency varies across firms.  Accordingly, we estimate the deterrent effect of regulatory 
stringency by the pollution intensity of the industry and by the source of the foreign investment. 
Results from our sample of joint venture projects suggest an important linkage between 
technology and pollution-haven behavior. For the sample of projects from OECD source countries, we 
find no evidence of pollution-haven-seeking behavior by investors, regardless of the pollution intensity of 
the industry.  In contrast, projects in highly polluting industries from Chinese sources (Hong Kong, 
Macao, and Taiwan) are significantly deterred by pollution taxes.  One possible explanation for this 
finding, supported by other studies, is that investment from advanced countries embodies newer 
technology, implying lower costs for abatement and a higher probability that a given plant will meet 
standards and avoid taxation.  Our evidence provides some support for the idea that firms from 
developing countries may be attracted by weak environmental regulations.  Thus, the attraction may be 
contingent on lack of access to advanced technology. 
In the next section, we describe FDI flows into China and China’s pollution levy system.  In the 
third section, we present a model of location choice, incorporating the firm’s endogenous response to 
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pollution taxes, local factor prices, and local market conditions.  We specify a profit function and we 
derive a proposition that forms the basis for our empirical work.  In the fourth section, we describe our 
econometric approach and describe the data.  Next, we present the results of the conditional and nested 
multinomial logit analysis.  Finally, we interpret our results and suggest some likely explanations for the 
differences we find in firm behavior. 
  6
 
II. FDI Flows and Environmental Stringency in China  
In many ways, China is an ideal site for a study of pollution-haven behavior.  China has been the 
largest recipient of FDI in the developing world since 1990 (Broadman and Sun, 1997; Henley, et al., 
1999).  During the period we will examine, 1993-96, FDI inflows surged dramatically across most of the 
country.  This surge followed the 1992 liberalization in trade and foreign exchange regimes, which 
included some new favorable terms for FDI (Shuguang, et al., 1998).  Yet the distribution of investment 
within China is highly uneven, raising obvious questions about the factors that attract capital inflows.  
Henley et al. report that 80% of cumulative FDI inflows have located in one of China’s ten eastern 
provinces.  This distribution clearly reflects the influence of special incentive programs,5 and the policy of 
gradual opening pursued before the new guidelines issued in 1992.6  However, as Huang (2003) notes, in 
comparison to investment flows to other countries at similar stages of development, the inflows to China 
were remarkable for their wide distribution among industries and provinces.  Of the 28 manufacturing 
industries included in the 1995 Industrial Census, none had received more than 10 percent of total FDI.7  
Moreover, while the interior regions of China received only about 13 % of cumulative FDI flows between 
                                                 
5In 1979, the Chinese national government began accepting foreign investment and in 1980 established four 
special economic zones (SEZs) within Guangdong and Fujian provinces.  In 1984, fourteen coastal cities 
received special incentive programs for FDI. Additional zones have been established since to encourage 
development of interior locations. As Head and Ries (1996) note, however, after the issue in 1986 of a new 
legal framework governing foreign investment, certain incentives were available anywhere in China to foreign 
enterprises that produced for export or introduced advanced technology. 
6See Tseng and Zebregs (2002).  In 1992, the Chinese government significantly liberalized its FDI regime.  As 
Lardy (1994) reports, it removed a number of sectoral and regional restrictions on FDI and decentralized 
approval from the central government to local governments. New rules introduced in 1995 grouped investment 
into three categories.  “Encouraged” investment includes new agricultural technology; construction of energy, 
communications, and raw materials projects for local industry; projects that enhance exports; projects that use 
renewable resources or involve new technology or equipment for pollution control or prevention; and 
investments developing the central and western parts of China.  “Restricted” investment includes projects 
already developed, where the technology has already been imported and capacity can meet demand; projects in 
industries where the state is experimenting with foreign investment while a state monopoly still exists; 
exploration and/or extraction of minerals; and projects in industries requiring central planning.  “Prohibited” 
investment includes dangerous, polluting, or wasteful processes. See Henley, et al. (1999). 
7 See Huang (2003), Table 1.4. 
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1992 and 1998, its total value was $31.5 billion, exceeding the entire FDI inflow to India during the same 
period.8   
 China also offers the opportunity to study the response of investors to the Chinese water pollution 
levy system--the broadest application of a price-based mechanism in the developing world (see Appendix 
A).  We know of no previous study that estimates the strength of environmental regulation in shaping 
foreign investment flows within China.9  The Chinese water discharge levy depends upon both 
concentration and volume.  For each plant, a pollutant-specific discharge factor is calculated, based on 
both total waste water discharge and the degree to which pollutant concentration exceeds the standard for 
each water pollutant.  Concentration standards are set jointly at the national and provincial level, and vary 
across provinces and across pollutants.  If a pollutant concentration is more than (less than or equal to) the 
standard, a charge (no charge) is applied.10  These charges, which are set at the national level, vary by 
pollutant but not by industry.   For each plant, the potential levy is calculated for each pollutant.  The final 
levy imposed on the plant is the greatest of these potential levies.     
 Another important feature of FDI in China which is relevant for testing the pollution haven 
hypothesis is differences across source countries.  According to Henley, et al. (1999) between 1985 and 
1996, 66.4% of FDI into China came from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.  (An unknown proportion of 
this investment originated in mainland China and found its way back to China in a practice known as 
‘roundtripping.’)  While dispersed throughout China, FDI from these sources, especially from Hong 
Kong, concentrated in the southern coastal provinces.  Much of this investment involved labor-intensive 
processing of imported inputs for re-export.  During the same time period, only 8% of FDI came from the 
United States and 8% from Japan.11  Investments from Japan and the West tended to be undertaken by 
                                                 
8 Figures provided by Huang (2003), page 28. 
9 Levinson (1996a, 1996b) and Keller and Levinson (2002) perform such studies using US state-level abatement 
costs.  Because state rules and implementation differ, they are able to identify the impact of controls on firm 
location.  Henderson (1996) and Kahn (1997) use county-level variation in compliance with national air quality 
standards.  The US does not rely primarily on a price-based system, however, and it is difficult to relate these 
measures to actual regulatory instruments. 
10 Beginning in 1993, a fee was imposed on all wastewater.  See appendix A for details. 
11 No other country provided more than 3% of total FDI into China during 1985-96.  See Henley, et al., Table 7. 
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transnational corporations that produced goods for the Chinese market.12   
Investors based in Macao, Hong Kong, or Taiwan are likely to have family or business interests 
in neighboring provinces.  These links may be very close, and as Head and Ries (1996) emphasize, an 
unobserved share of the investment from Chinese sources is ‘roundtripping’ and its location choice 
decision influenced by the location of mainland connections.13  The fact that Chinese investment is 
largely for export, while transnational corporations generally target the local market , suggests that the 
two types of projects may be of substantially different character.  Fung, Iizaka, and Parker (2002) find 
that investment from Japan and the U.S. is sensitive to provincial labor quality, while investment from 
Hong Kong and Taiwan is, in contrast, not sensitive to labor quality  but to labor costs.14  Head and Ries 
(1996) find evidence that previous foreign investment, high labor productivity, good transportation, and a 
large pool of local suppliers make a city more attractive to non-Chinese investors, but that low industrial 
wages have no significant influence.     
 It is also likely that EJVs from high-income countries use cleaner technologies than do Chinese 
EJVs.   Since industrial countries generally have relatively stringent standards compared to Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, or Macao, they are more likely to develop and use cleaner technologies.  Lanjouw and Mody 
(1996) report that the United States, Japan, and Germany were the most important sources of 
environmental innovation and diffusion during the 1970s and 1980s and that the share of these 
innovations related to water pollution control increased dramatically over time, as detailed emissions 
standards and technology specification became common.  In addition, firms from high-standard countries 
report high costs to installing and maintaining older vintage technology in new plants, even when these 
plants are located in countries with weaker standards.  Survey data on EJVs in China collected and 
reported by Loren Brandt and Susan Zhu indicate important technological differences among foreign 
                                                 
12 While some authors describe investment from ethnic-Chinese economies as smaller scale, Huang (2003) reports 
that the average size of individual FDI projects from Japan, Korea, the United States, and Thailand are not 
substantially larger than those from Chinese sources. 
13 For this reason, Head and Ries (1996) exclude projects with partners from Hong Kong, Macao, and Singapore 
from their analysis of FDI flows to Chinese cities in 1984-1991. 
14 Similar results are found in Fung, Iizaka, Lin, and Siu (2002) and Gao (2002), who use more comprehensive 
measures of labor quality. 
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parents.15  While performance requirements were common among joint ventures initiated during 1987-
1993,  Brandt and Zhu report that only about one-third of joint ventures from Hong Kong were required 
to transfer advanced technology from the parent firm, while about three-fourths of joint ventures from 
industrial country investors were required to do so.16  This technological difference is even more likely if 
Chinese EJVs actually represent round-tripping.  Thus, it is likely that Chinese and foreign EJVs have 
access to different pollution control technologies and we investigate separately the strength of each type 
of investor’s attraction to provinces with weak standards.   
Table 1 shows the percent of national FDI inflows (actually utilized17) locating in high, medium, 
and low-income provinces, based on income averages throughout the period.18   In 1987, nearly 80% of 
foreign investment located in provinces with relatively high GDP per capita, while only 8% located in one 
of the lowest-income provinces.   A similarly large gap is found in 1995, with high-income provinces 
receiving 64% of FDI while the lowest-income provinces only received 9%.  A closer look, however, 
reveals that the rich-province share declines fairly steadily throughout the period.  Flows into the low-
income group appear stagnant, while the share of FDI flowing to the moderate-income group nearly 
doubles.  
 The relationship between FDI inflows and two indicators of environmental stringency are also 
shown in Table 1.  Provinces are first grouped by average effective water pollution levy during the period.  
It is clear that the highest shares of FDI inflows are found in provinces with the most stringent 
environmental regulations.  The differential is quite large, and holds for every year in the period. 
Provinces are also grouped by average discharge intensity (tons of COD discharge per million yuan 
                                                 
15 Our thanks to Susan Zhu for making this information available. 
16 Brandt and Zhu (undated) write: For the joint ventures that have investors from Hong Kong, only 35% were 
required to transfer advanced technology from foreign parent and 5% were required to transfer a patent from foreign 
parent.  For the joint ventures having investors from developed countries, 76% were required to transfer advanced 
technology and 29% were required to transfer a patent from foreign parent.  Only 6% of the firms having partners 
from Hong Kong were required to manufacture certain components or final products in China, while 42% of the 
firms with partners from developed countries had this requirement.  From this we may infer that the technology flow 
will be larger for the joint ventures that have foreign parents from developed countries. (p. 7) 
17FDI inflow in a given year is not necessarily utilized immediately, since its use requires approval.  
18 Hainan and Tibet are excluded due to lack of data. 
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output (1990 yuan)) over the period.  To the extent that discharge intensity is an indicator of laxity of 
standards and/or concentration of pollution-intensive industries, it appears that neither of these factors 
attracts FDI.  Most FDI flows to provinces with relatively low discharge intensity.    
 Since per capita income and pollution levies are strongly correlated (Dean, 2002; Wang and 
Wheeler 2003, 2005), it is not clear from this evidence the extent to which each of these characteristics 
influences location choice.  It is clear that FDI is not flowing to provinces with the least stringent 
regulations.  Over time, however, there is a reduction in the share of FDI going to provinces with high 
pollution levies (low discharge intensity), and an increase in the share going to the group with moderate 
pollution levies (moderate discharge intensity).  Since provinces show increased levies over time, the 
trends in Table 1 could indicate that FDI moves in response to stricter environmental regulations.    
  11
 
III. Theoretical Model 
A Model of Production and Emissions 
Like Smarzynska and Wei (2001) we consider a multinational firm that wants to invest one unit 
of capital to produce somewhere in a given region.19  We assume that China has been chosen because it is 
the lowest-cost region in which to produce.  Therefore, the decision for the firm is to choose the host 
province within China that produces the highest profit.  
 We treat foreign firms as price takers with respect to pollution taxes.  Local variations in 
enforcement raise the possibility that firms may negotiate over pollution levies with local authorities. 
However, as explained in Appendix A, such negotiations occur after production and emissions decisions 
have been made by the firm, following an inspection by local authorities.  We assume, therefore, that at 
the time that a location decision is made by the firm, the exact levy rate it will be charged is unknown but 
that the firm has information on the effective rate per unit that provincial regulators have actually charged 
local firms in the past.  As this rate is influenced both by the statutory rate and by enforcement practices, 
we use this effective rate as the firm’s indicator of provincial environmental regulatory stringency. 
 Our treatment of production follows Copeland and Taylor (2003).  We consider a firm that jointly 
produces two outputs, good X and emissions Z, using variable inputs of unskilled labor, skilled labor, and 
intermediate (locally-provided) services. The capital input is embodied in the original investment and is 
fixed in the short run.  Abatement of emissions is possible, so emission intensity is a choice for the firm.  
We assume that the firm can allocate an endogenous fraction, θ, of its inputs to abatement activity.  This 
implies that abatement and production use factors in the same proportion.  If θ = 0 , there is no abatement 
and, by choice of units, each unit of output generates one unit of pollution.  The joint production 
technology is given by: 
                                                 
19We take the decision to produce abroad, as well as the region in which the project will be located, as made in 
a prior stage.  Zhang and Markusen (1999) consider the firm’s choice of producing at home and exporting or 
producing abroad. 
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(1) 
where L is unskilled labor, H is skilled labor, and s is a vector of locally provided services.  The function 
Ix(s) aggregates these local service varieties into an intermediate input for the foreign firm.  We assume 
that F is increasing and concave, and 0)1(,1)0(,10 ==≤≤ φφθ .   
To aid our ability to derive an estimating equation, we follow Copeland and Taylor (2003) and 
assume that the relation between abatement activity and emissions is given by 
     1/( ) (1 ) ,αφ θ θ= −          (2) 
where 0 1.α≤ ≤ Using this form, we can eliminate theta and invert the joint production technology to 
obtain a net production function in which emissions is treated as an input: 
   (1 )[ ( , , ( ))] .x x x xX Z F L H I s
α α−=                      (3)   
If we assume that the production function is generalized Cobb-Douglas, 
   ( , , ) ( ( )) ,
b d e
x x x x x xF L H I AL H I s=      (4) 
where b, d, and e are constants, and A is a measure of Hicks neutral technological progress, the net 
production function becomes  
   (1 ) ( ( )) ,x x x xX Z A L H I s
α α β δ ε−=                     (5) 
where ),1(),1( αδαβ −=−= db and )1( αε −= e .  We note that , , ,α β δ ε  are factor shares and in 
particular that α is the share of pollution taxes in the value of output. 
 Profit maximization implies cost minimization.  Let τ be the emissions tax rate, u the wage for 
unskilled labor, h the wage for skilled labor, and 
~ps  a price index for locally-provided services.  Using 
the net production function, the cost of producing X units in province j is 
 
(1 ) 1 1
( , , , , ) ( ) ,X j j j sj j j j j X jC u h p X KA w h p X Kc w X
α α β δ ε
γ γ γ γ γ γ γτ τ
− −
= = r% %  (6) 
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where 1γ α β δ ε= + + + <  and the vector ( , , , )sw u h pτ=r % .  To begin, we assume that the firm produces 
only for export to a third market, so the price of the final good produced by the project, ,fp does not vary 
by province.  The maximum profit earned on fixed capital investment in any province j is given by the 
profit function: 
 
1 1 1
1 1 1 1( , ) .
( )
f f
Xj j
X j
p w p
Kc w
γ
γ γ
γ γ γπ γ γ −− − −    = −          
r
r  (7) 
 
This profit function is multiplicative and, therefore, linear in logs.   
 Using (7), we can explore how an increase in the emissions tax rate changes the maximum profit 
that an investor can earn in a given province.  The emissions tax rate enters the cost function, ( ),Xc w
r
so 
using Shepard’s lemma and denoting proportionate changes with a “∧”, 
 1
ˆ ( , )1 0.
ˆ 1 1
( ) ( , )
f
Xj j X j
j f
X j j
Z p w
c w X p w γ
π τ α
τ γ γ= − = − <− −
r
r r
 (8) 
 
The maximum profit that can be earned in province j falls in response to a 1 percent increase in the 
emissions tax.  Additionally, this effect is proportional to the share of pollution taxes in total variable 
costs when the firm chooses inputs optimally. 
 Equation (8) leads to the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 1: The effect of a higher pollution levy on potential profits: 
 
(a) is larger for industries in which variable costs are a larger relative cost share; 
(b) is larger for firms within an industry that are less efficient in their ability to abate pollution. 
 
PROOF: This proposition follows directly from the properties of the profit function.  Part a can be easily 
proved by comparing two industries that have the same abatement efficiency (the same value for α) but 
different values for the sum of b, d, and e.  The industry with the larger sum has a larger variable cost 
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share (a larger value forγ ).  Statement (a) then follows from equation (8): the effect of a levy increase on 
potential profits is larger for industries that have higher variable costs relative to total cost.   
For part b, we note that the efficiency of a firm in abating pollution is governed by the abatement 
function (2).  A less efficient firm has a higher α value, but the same factor shares b, d, and e as other 
firms in the same industry.  Therefore, using equation (8), an increase in the pollution tax has a larger 
effect on the potential profits of the less efficient firm. 
This proposition provides us with the basis for testable hypotheses about location choice.   Part a 
of the proposition leads to the hypothesis that industries with highly polluting production technology will 
be more sensitive than low-polluting industries to pollution levy differences across provinces.  Part b 
suggests the hypothesis that, within an industry, firms with less efficient abatement technologies will be 
more sensitive to differences in levy rates.   
Foreign Investment and Local Suppliers 
 
 Previous research by Head and Ries (1996) suggests that firms have higher profits when they 
locate in areas where other foreign firms have located.  We incorporate agglomeration into our model 
using the derivation in Head and Ries.  The function, I(s), aggregates local service varieties, si, into a 
composite intermediate good.  It is assumed to take a constant elasticity of substitution form with the 
substitution elasticity given by σ.  Positing a standard monopolistic competition framework for the market 
for local services, Head and Ries assume that all service providers face the same unit cost function, 
( ).Sc w
r
  If the number of suppliers is large, each firm faces an iso-elastic demand curve and sets the 
price ( ) / .s sP c w σ= r   Given this symmetry, each service provider sets the same price and produces the 
same quantity.  Moreover, final goods producers use the same amount of each variety, leading to the 
aggregated service input, 1/( ) sI s N s
σ= where s is the common quantity of each service variety.   
We now develop an intermediates price index, which appears in the profit function and which 
measures the price per effective service unit.  Note that the total amount paid by a final-good producer for 
  15
intermediates is ,s sP N s  while the number of effective units is given by I(s).  Dividing the total amount 
paid by effective units provides the price index, ( 1) / .s s sp P N
σ σ−=%   This price index is decreasing in the 
number of service providers, which reflects the notion that effective costs may be lowered by an increase 
in the number of varieties, as well as by a reduction in the price of a representative variety. 
 Head and Ries derive the equilibrium number of local service providers by assuming that they 
must invest in costly upgrading in order to serve foreign-invested firms.  The net profits obtained by an 
entrant into the intermediates sector depend on the direct costs of upgrading to satisfy foreign quality 
requirements and on the value of any foregone opportunity.  The total cost of upgrading is assumed to 
vary across potential entrants.  Within this context, Head and Ries show that the number of local service 
firms is a function of local factor prices (because profits fall as costs rise), the final goods price, Pf , and 
the number of foreign-invested firms producing final goods, fN , (because profits rise with a higher 
demand for intermediates from final-goods producers), and the number of potential suppliers, N s  (which 
implies a larger number of local firms that can profitably upgrade).20   Thus, in equilibrium,  
 ( , , , ),f fs sN w P N Nζ= r  (9) 
where the function ( )ζ ? is multiplicative. Assuming that intermediates are produced with skilled and 
unskilled labor in a Cobb-Douglas technology and adopting the Head and Ries assumption that upgrading 
costs are uniformly distributed among potential entrants, it can be shown that the price index takes the 
form 
 
( 1) /
2
( ) ( , , , ) ( ) ,f f f fss s s
c wp w P N N K u h P N N
σ σ ρµ νζσ
−   = =   
r r%  (10) 
where K2 is a constant and the exponents are functions of the underlying final-goods and intermediates 
production parameters.   
                                                 
20The derivation is contained in Head and Ries (1996), pages 42-44 and the appendix A. 
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Substituting this expression back into the foreign firm’s profit function (7) yields a expression 
that is multiplicative in its arguments and, thus, linear in logs.  The coefficients in the linearized profit 
function reflect the underlying production parameters.  Under the assumption that local service providers 
do not pollute or are not subject to pollution fees, the pollution levy coefficient indicates the share of 
pollution fees in total variable cost.  If local service providers do pollute and are subject to pollution fees, 
this coefficient reflects the share of direct plus indirect pollution fees in total variable cost.  This 
coefficient can be estimated and used to test hypotheses based on Proposition 1. 
Other Provincial Characteristics 
Clearly other province-specific characteristics, such as special investment incentives, transport 
costs, and infrastructure, must be included in the overall location choice problem of the firm.   Following 
Head and Ries (1996), incentives can be added as a proportionate shift factor to the profit function.  We 
also introduce variables that capture transportation costs, which we implicitly assume are lower in 
provinces with larger infrastructure stocks.  Finally, we relax the assumption that firms receive the same 
price in every province.  The literature indicates that some firms, particularly those with joint venture 
partners based in the United States and Japan, produce for the local market.  To capture the attractiveness 
of the local market, we introduce arguments to the profit function that attempt to measure local income 
and market size.   
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IV. Econometric Method and Data Description 
 Estimation Method 
 Thus far, the model assumes that all foreign investors within an industry are identical.  
Consequently, one province will be the highest profit site for all projects within an industry.  Sample data, 
however, show considerable variation in the location choices within industries.  To explain this, we posit 
that there are unobservable features of each firm that make some provinces more attractive than others.  
Suppose that for each investor i the attractiveness of province j depends on the sum of ln ijπ  and a host of 
unobserved idiosyncratic features .ijε   If ε ij are distributed independently according to a Type I Extreme 
Value distribution (whose density is given by exp [-exp( ε )], then the probability, Pij  , that investor i 
chooses province j where  j  is a member of choice set J is given by 
 
( )exp ln
(ln )
exp(ln )
ij
ij ij ij
ijj J
P F
ππ π∈
= = ∑  (11) 
 
and we represent ijπ by equation (7).  Our baseline estimation of equation (11) is a conditional logit.  The 
conditional logit model is well suited for the location choice framework since it exploits extensive 
information on alternatives, can account for match-specific details, and allows for multiple alternatives.21 
Equation (11) is estimated using data on 2,886 manufacturing equity joint ventures undertaken 
during 1993-1996 across 28 provinces and 27 3-digit ISIC industries.  Estimation is done using the full 
sample and two subsamples: projects with partners from “Chinese” sources, including Hong Kong, 
Macao, Taiwan (China), Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines; and projects from “Foreign” sources, 
including the United States, Japan, and other industrial countries.22  A key assumption underlying the 
                                                 
21 An alternative approach is to use count data and a Poisson or negative binomial specification.  These count 
approaches are appropriate when there is a preponderance of zeros and small values for counts (Greene, 2003).  Data 
used by Keller and Levinson (2002) and List (2001) have this characteristic. 
 
22 From our original data source, we identified projects as Chinese, other South East Asian, or non-Chinese in 
origin.  The first two groups were designated "Chinese."  We were not able to identify the source for 78 out of 626 
projects in 1996, 113 out of 682 in 1995, 79 out of 801 in 1994, and 22 out of 777 in 1993.  These projects are 
  18
conditional logit model estimates--the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)--may not fit the 
Chinese circumstances well, given investors’ geographic links to Coastal provinces, clustering of prior 
investment and natural resources, and the gradual nature of the opening process from the coast, then 
inland and finally west.  If the IIA condition is not met, we can turn to the nested logit model.  The 
location choice process becomes a two-level nested decision--choosing among Chinese regions and then 
making a specific choice of province within a region.  We estimate the nested logit model using full 
information maximum likelihood estimation. 23 
 
 Data Description and Sources 
A complete description of all variable definitions and sources is provided in Appendix B.  We 
compiled data for a sample of equity joint venture investments undertaken during 1993-1996, using 
project descriptions available from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
(MOFTEC).24  In the tables and figures that follow provinces are grouped into four regions:  north coast, 
south coast, inland and west.25  The distribution of the sample of EJVs across provinces is shown in Table 
2.  Figures 1 and 2 provide the distribution of the EJV sample across provinces by source and by 2-digit 
ISIC industrial sectors, respectively.  Figure 1 shows that both Chinese and Foreign partners engage in 
equity joint ventures in all provinces.  Investment into the south coast region is predominantly Chinese, 
reflecting both the geographic proximity and early opening of these provinces.  In contrast, investment 
into north coast region is split more equally between both sources, a feature sometimes linked to the 
industrial concentration there.  Figure 2, however, shows that the source distribution is unlikely to be 
                                                                                                                                                             
scattered across nearly all provinces.  Since Chinese FDI constituted about two-thirds of total FDI to China in 1996, 
these projects were assumed to be of Chinese origin.  We report the results of sensitivity analysis of this choice 
below. 
23 Further discussion of the application of these methods to modeling firm location decisions can be found in 
Ondrich and Wasylenko (1993). 
24 Equity joint ventures are limited liability companies incorporated in China, in which foreign and Mainland 
Chinese investors hold equity.  For further details, see Fung (1997). 
25 North Coast: Beijing, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Tianjin; South Coast:  Fujian, 
Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu; Inland:  Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Shanxi; 
West: Gansu, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Tibet, Yunnan, Xinjiang. 
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driven by industrial concentration to any great extent as most provinces received investment in a wide 
range of sectors.  The most pronounced specialization occurs in the west region, where mining and other 
natural-resource based activities dominate.  Separate calculations show that the distribution of Chinese 
and Foreign projects across industries grouped by pollution intensity is very similar.  The correlation 
between the Chinese and Foreign industry shares is 0.99.  
 Figure 3 shows the distribution of EJVs across 3-digit ISIC industries by source.  Since about 
two-thirds of total FDI in this time period is of Chinese origin, it is not surprising that Chinese FDI 
accounts for about 60-70 % of the FDI in most sectors.  An even larger percent of investment in tobacco 
(314), leather goods (323), printing and publishing (342), and other manufactured products (390) is from 
Chinese sources.26  In contrast, more than 50 percent of investment in petroleum refining (353), 
machinery manufacturing (382, 383) and professional and scientific instruments (385) is from the U.S., 
Japan, and other non-Chinese sources.  This provides some support for the notion that Foreign investors 
are more specialized in relatively capital- or high-tech-intensive industries compared to Chinese investors. 
Our theoretical framework indicates that our estimating equation should include controls for 
factor prices, the stock of FDI, the number of potential domestic suppliers, the presence of FDI incentives, 
infrastructure, and local market size.  The Chinese Statistical Yearbook (various years) was used to 
compile data on labor supplies, agglomeration, and availability of intermediates suppliers, infrastructure 
and incentives.  Summary data for provincial characteristics (period averages, 1993-1996) are shown in 
Table 3.   Although provincial wage data are available, they are not differentiated across labor types.  
However, a distribution of the labor force by educational attainment categories is available for each 
province from the 1990 Population Census and a 1% sample of the population performed in 1995.27 Since 
labor mobility between provinces is still low, we assume that relative labor supplies will proxy relative 
wages in each province.  We define unskilled labor as the lowest educational level (illiterate and less than 
primary level), and skilled labor as the two top educational categories, senior secondary education and 
                                                 
26 The tobacco industry is monopolized by the Chinese government and heavily regulated. 
27 We interpolate between these years to develop a time series. 
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college and beyond.  We then construct relative factor supplies as the percentage of skilled (unskilled) 
labor relative to the percentage of semi-skilled labor (the sum of the remaining categories, primary level 
and junior secondary level). 
Agglomeration is proxied by the real value of cumulative FDI, measured for the period 1983 to 
the year before the project is undertaken for each province.28  Availability of potential suppliers of 
intermediate goods is proxied by the number of domestic enterprises.  We create this measure by taking 
the total number of enterprises at the township level and above (thereby capturing larger enterprises that 
may have the capacity to supply a foreign-invested plant) and subtracting the number of enterprises that 
are wholly or partly foreign owned.29   As in other studies, we include several measures of infrastructure.  
Transport infrastructure is proxied by the length of roads and inland waterways (both adjusted for 
provincial size).  Telecommunications infrastructure is proxied by the number of urban subscribers 
relative to population .  Given the numerous incentives given to FDI in China, an incentive dummy was 
created that takes a value of one if there is a special economic zone (SEZ) or open coastal city (OCC) in 
the province.  This variable does not vary during the 1993-1996 period.  
 To measure China's regulatory stringency, we use an effective water pollution levy rate.  This is 
calculated as total provincial water pollution tax revenues divided by tons of wastewater exceeding the 
provincial discharge standard.  This effective tax rate has a number of useful features.  It reflects actual 
charges to firms per unit of polluted wastewater and, thus, may reasonably be interpreted as a “factor 
price of emissions.” It also varies across provinces and over time.  Part of the variation is due to 
differences in concentration standards, which determine the extent of “excess” pollution, and which are 
determined jointly by the national and local governments.  Part of the variation is also due to significant 
differences in enforcement capacity at the local level.  Levies can be reduced or eliminated at the 
discretion of local regulators after inspection and, thus, vary with the weight placed upon environmental 
                                                 
28 Calculated using data from Coughlin et al., 2000. 
29 Specifically, we subtract those firms which are classified as “foreign-funded” or “funded by entrepreneurs from 
Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan.” 
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protection by local authorities.  Provinces that commonly reduce the levy below its de jure level will 
receive few revenues from the tax and, by the effective levy measure, will have weak stringency. 
The maps in figure 4 provide some perspective on the variation in water pollution levies and FDI 
location across provinces and over time.  Higher (lower) levies are shown by darker (lighter) shades of 
grey, while the percentage of total FDI inflow to a province (in a given year) is shown by the height of the 
cylinder.  In 1993 and still in 1996, FDI located largely in the north and south coastal regions.  Some FDI 
located inland, but almost none in the west.  Within the coastal and inland regions there is wide variation 
in the amount of FDI located in each province.  In 1993 there is also wide variation in the effective 
pollution levies charged by each province, with the highest levies found largely along the coast.  While 
there is still variation in 1996, nearly the entire map has darkened, indicating an increase in the pollution 
levies across most parts of the country.  It is evident that in both 1993 and 1996, there is a positive 
correlation between the water pollution levy and the percent of FDI inflow locating in a province. 
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V.  Results 
 Conditional Logit 
 Because the pollution levy has a similar effect to a factor price, we would expect all firms to be 
attracted to areas with low levies.  Table 4 column (1) reports the conditional logit results for the full 
sample, without fixed effects.  All variables are in logs (except growth) and are lagged 1 year so that they 
might represent the state of information available to an investor prior to the location decision that year.   
The most striking result is the strong positive response of EJVs to the pollution levy.  This suggests that 
EJVs are attracted to provinces with relatively stringent standards, even after controlling for income level 
and income growth, which are often associated with better pollution regulation.  This is clearly the 
opposite of the pollution haven hypothesis, but it is robust to the inclusion of many variables attempting 
to capture the public goods and services provided by regions with active local governments. 
Based on previous work such as Head and Ries (1996) and Cheng and Kwan (2001), we expect 
all firms to be attracted to provinces with large stocks of FDI and large numbers of potential suppliers, as 
well as provinces with special incentives for foreign investment and good infrastructure.  We find that  
EJVs are strongly attracted to provinces with high levels of prior FDI, large numbers of potential local 
suppliers, special incentives, rapid growth, and relatively abundant skilled workers.  Results for the 
infrastructure variables indicate that firms seek dense road and waterway networks.  The estimated 
coefficient for telephone coverage is negative and significant, but may simply be a poor proxy for 
telecommunications infrastructure.30   We also expected that firms seeking to sell into the local market 
would be attracted to areas that have rich and growing local markets, as measured by provincial 
consumption per capita and real provincial GDP growth.  While EJVs certainly appear attracted to fast-
growing markets, they seem to seek out markets with lower consumption per capita. 
                                                 
30 Other authors have found odd results using some measure of telephones.  An alternate measure--the number of 
telephones (per thousand people) also yielded similarly odd results. 
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As in Keller and Levinson (2002), we find that inclusion of regional fixed effects is important.31  
In column (2) of  table 4, we see that EJVs are much more likely to locate on the northern and southern 
coasts,  and much less likely to locate in the west, relative to the inland region (the omitted region).  
Notably, although the positive coefficient on log levy is smaller, it is still strongly significant.  Other 
results remain largely unchanged, with the exception of incentives and unskilled labor. The effect of 
having an SEZ or OCC is no longer significant, which is not surprising since this dummy is time-
invariant.32  The sign on log ratio of unskilled labor switches from negative to positive but becomes 
insignificant.  This may be an indication of the importance of splitting the sample by source.  If 
comparative advantages do differ, Chinese joint ventures do produce for export, and Foreign EJVs 
produce for the local market, then we might expect the response to the labor variables to differ.  Chinese 
(Foreign) EJVs would be more attracted to markets with relatively large supplies of lower (higher) skilled 
workers, and deterred by markets with relatively large supplies of higher (lower) skilled workers.   
 By Proposition 1a, we expect the attraction of low levies to be stronger for high-polluting 
industries than for low-polluting industries.  As the table below indicates, industries are quite varied in 
their water-pollution intensity, with ISIC 34 (paper and paper products, printing) by far the worst polluter. 
Pollution Intensity by 2-digit ISIC Industry: 
1995 COD (kg.)/Real output (1,000 yuan) 
31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
7.7 1.2 NA 51.7 2.3 0.4 0.8 0.1 0.9
    Source:  World Bank.  Details in Data Appendix. 
                                                 
31 Inclusion of fixed effects at the provincial level was done, but required sacrificing the inclusion of the transport 
infrastructure variables which vary little over time (roads and inland waterways) and using an alternate measure of 
incentives which is time-variant.  For the latter, we chose a 3-year moving average of the incentive index developed 
by Demurger et al. (2002).  The inclusion of these provincial fixed effects, along with the other alterations described 
produced strong negative coefficients for agglomeration and the number of local suppliers--results which are at odds 
with the literature.  However, it did not alter the results shown for the pollution levy.  These result are available from 
the authors upon request. 
32 An alternative measure--a 3-year moving average of the incentive index developed by Demurger et al. (2002)--
produced, oddly, a negative significant coefficient on incentives.  However, it did not change the other results. 
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Using the data on COD-intensity of Chinese industrial output at the ISIC 3-digit level,33 we divide the 
sample into low, medium and high water-polluting industries.  Water pollution intensity (PI) is defined as 
low if it is below 1 kg per thousand yuan output (1990 yuan).  About 60 percent of the EJV projects in the 
sample are in industries designated as low polluters.  Another 24 percent of the sample are in industries 
with 1<PI<3.5, and are classified as medium polluters.  The final 16 percent are in industries with PI>7, 
and are denoted high polluters.  We construct three dummy variables to represent these three ranges of 
pollution intensity, and we interact the levy variable with these pollution-intensity dummies to test 
whether these groups respond differently to pollution regulation.34  The results, shown in column (3) still 
reveal a strong positive attraction to a higher pollution levy.  Although there is no significant difference in 
the response of medium polluting industries, industries that are highly polluting show a significantly 
lower attraction for provinces with high levies. 
 Proposition 1b suggests that the attraction of weak environmental regulations depends on the 
technological sophistication of the firm within a given industry.  As discussed above, there is prior 
evidence that projects from Chinese sources embody less advanced technology than do projects from non-
Chinese sources.  Our hypothesis is that the levy will have a stronger deterrent impact on Chinese firm 
location decisions than on Foreign firms, all else equal.  Columns  (4) and (5) in table 4 show the 
conditional logit results for the Chinese and Foreign sub-samples.35   Here we again see that foreign EJVs, 
rather than being attracted to low pollution levies, are strongly attracted to provinces with higher levies.  
This response is insensitive to the pollution intensity of the industry.  However, Chinese investors have a 
much smaller positive response to higher pollution levies than Foreign investors.  In addition, Chinese 
investors from highly polluting industries appear deterred by higher pollution levies.  This is consistent 
with the idea that Chinese investors may be more deterred by stringent pollution regulations than Foreign 
investors due to the use of less advanced technology.  However, a joint significance test shows that the 
                                                 
33 When 3-digit pollution intensity information is unavailable, the 2-digit value is used. 
34 The conversion to three dummies is due to the lack of high within-group variation in pollution-intensity, despite 
high between-group variation.   
35 The results discussed here are also confirmed in a single equation estimation which allows varying parameters by 
source. 
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response of these highly-polluting industries is not significantly different from zero.  Thus, at this point 
we can say that any attraction investors found from higher pollution levies vanishes if the firms are 
Chinese and highly-polluting.     
 Columns (4) and (5) also show that Chinese investors are less strongly attracted to locations with 
high ratios of skilled workers, and more positively attracted to locations with high ratios of unskilled 
workers (though the latter is not significant).  While Foreign investors are strongly attracted by 
government incentives and rapid growth, Chinese investors are not.  These results are broadly consistent 
with descriptions of Chinese investment as smaller scale, destined for export rather than for domestic 
consumption, and more labor-intensive than investment from industrial countries.  It may be that the 
group designated "Chinese" is too broad, including more South Asian countries than would merit 
inclusion based on Chinese populations or round-tripping concerns.36  In light of this possibility, all 
conditional logits were rerun with the South Asian sample omitted, but the results were unaffected. 
 Nested Logits 
It is possible that the decision to locate EJVs in China is actually a nested one.  If so, it may be 
that our lack of support for the pollution haven hypothesis is simply an artifact of choosing particular 
geographic regions within which to invest.  Based on Hausman tests using the conditional logit 
specifications in table 4, the null hypothesis of IIA was indeed rejected.  Thus, we re-estimate the model 
using nested logit.  The investor is assumed to first choose which region (north coast, south coast, inland, 
or west) in which to invest, and then which province within the region.  At the regional level, we assumed 
that investors would be attracted by overall development, size of market, and growth potential.  Thus we 
include regional averages of consumption per capita, population, and real income growth as determinants 
of regional choice.  
 Table 5 shows results for the full sample, the full sample with pollution-intensity incorporated, 
and finally the Chinese and Foreign subsamples.  For both the full sample and the source subsamples, the 
null hypothesis that the IV parameters =1--that the decision is not nested--is rejected.  In the full sample 
                                                 
36 We are indebted to K.C. Fung for this observation. 
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results, investors are significantly attracted to regions with high consumption per capita and with high 
annual real income growth, a finding consistent with the view that firms look for relatively rich and 
growing local markets for their products.  The Chinese investors actually appear attracted to regions with 
high incomes, large populations, and high real income growth, while Foreign investors are influenced by  
the first two, but not the last.   
 Within a region, the characteristics that attract investors follow the same patterns as were found in 
the conditional logits.  For the full sample, once again investors are attracted by higher pollution levies, 
although there is no significant difference in the response based on pollution intensity.  Looking at the 
source subsamples, we again see that Chinese investors have a much smaller positive response to the levy 
than Foreign investors.  Once again, there is no attraction for the Chinese highly-polluting EJVs.37   
Foreign EJVs respond positively to higher levies, regardless of pollution intensity.  Other differences 
between the two investment sources also persist.  Foreign EJVs show a larger positive response than 
Chinese EJVs to relatively large supplies of skilled labor, provincial real growth rates, and the presence of 
special incentives.38 
 State Ownership 
 Thus far, the analysis has made no adjustment for the level of state ownership across provinces or 
changes in state ownership over time.  Table 3 shows the share of industrial output from state-owned 
entreprises (SOEs) for each province, averaged over the period.  The range is wide--from a low of 19% in 
Zhejiang to 80% in  Tibet.  It is also somewhat distinct regionally, with the lowest levels found in the 
South coast, and the highest in the west.  Changes in the level of state ownership between 1993 and 1996 
are also quite varied, ranging from decreases of  1 (Shandong) to 26 (Hubei) percentage points, with an 
increase of 7 percentage points in Xinjiang.   
                                                 
37 The estimated coefficient for high pollution industries (-0.29= 0.28-0.57) is not significant at the 95% confidence 
level.   
38 All nested logits were also subjected to the same sensitivity tests:  exclusion of S. Asian observations; alternate 
telecom proxy; alternate incentive index.  In no case did these tests produce significant differences in the results 
shown in table 5.   
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 We make several modifications to our specification to incorporate the effects of SOEs into the 
analysis.  First, investors may see low levels of SOEs as indicative of a more market-oriented economy.  
Hence the appeal of certain features of a province may be reduced if that province has a large level of 
SOEs.  In the previous results both incentives and consumption per capita had either perverse or 
insignificant effects for part or all of the sample.  To test whether this might be due to state ownership, we 
interact these two variables with the degree to which the economy is non-state-owned (1-share of 
industrial output from SOEs).  Second, large reductions in state ownership may be a signal of 
commitment to liberalization.  To account for this, we introduce the annual change in the share of 
industrial output from SOEs as a determinant of location choice.  Overall we anticipate that the impact of 
SOEs will be more relevant for Foreign investors relative to Chinese, since the former are producing for 
the local market. 
 The results of introducing SOEs into the conditional and nested logits are shown in tables 6 and 7, 
respectively.  While the coefficient estimates for the pollution levy are smaller in all specifications, the 
impact of the levy remains the same.  For the full sample, FDI is still attracted by higher levies.  This 
attraction still vanishes for highly polluting industries in the conditional logit estimates; the nested logit 
estimates again show no sensitivity to pollution intensity.  Chinese investors are not influenced 
significantly by the levy, except for highly polluting EJVs.  In both the conditional and nested logits, the 
joint significance tests now show the reaction of Chinese high polluters to be negative and significantly 
different from zero.  Foreign investors are again consistently attracted by high levies, regardless of the 
pollution intensity of the industry.    
 Notably, FDI is now strongly attracted by special incentives, both in the full sample and Chinese 
and Foreign subsamples.  FDI is also now strongly attracted to provinces with higher consumption per 
capita in both the full sample and the Foreign subsample.  These two results suggest that higher state 
ownership does dampen the appeal of other features of a province for the investor.  Finally, a larger drop 
in state ownership increases the likelihood that the investor will locate there.  This effect is particularly 
strong in the nested logit results, for both the full sample and the Foreign subsample.  Overall, the Foreign 
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subsample does appear more sensitive to incentives, higher incomes, income growth, and reductions in 
state ownership than the Chinese subsample. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Because it is host to the largest share of direct investment flows to the developing world, and 
because environmental stringency varies among its provinces, China is an excellent location for testing 
the pollution haven hypothesis.  We have created and analyzed a new compilation of foreign equity joint 
ventures into China during 1993-1996, categorized by industry and province.  These data exhibit a wide 
dispersion of foreign investment across 3-digit industries and provinces.  We categorize projects by the 
source of funds, dividing them into those funded from non-Chinese and Chinese countries.  Our evidence 
from conditional and nested logit analysis suggests that both types of investment are attracted to prior 
foreign investment, the number of local suppliers, and special incentives.  Both non-Chinese-sourced and 
Chinese-sourced investment appears to be attracted to provinces with high relative endowments of skilled 
labor.   
Conditional logit analysis indicates that Chinese-sourced equity joint ventures in highly polluting 
industries are deterred by relatively stringent pollution regulation.  This finding is consistent with the 
behavior described in the pollution haven hypothesis, though it contradicts the notion that the pollution 
havens are created by industrial country investors.   In contrast, equity joint ventures from non-Chinese 
sources are actually attracted to provinces with more stringent environmental regulations, regardless of 
pollution-intensity--the opposite of the pollution haven hypothesis.  This attraction also holds for Chinese 
equity investment in low and medium pollution-intenstive industries, though to a lesser extent.  Even after 
accounting for the possibility of a nested decision, environmental stringency still significantly attracts 
non-Chinese equity investment, while significantly deterring only Chinese equity investment in highly 
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pollution-intensive activities.  In all specifications, corrections for the degree of state ownership reduce 
the size of the pollution levy effects, but do not alter their effects or significance. 
These results suggest the importance of accounting for firm heterogeneity in considering the 
attraction of weak environmental regulations.  Firms in industries that use low-polluting processes appear 
to respond positively to higher pollution taxes.  Firms using heavily polluting processes, while expected 
to respond significantly to the implied factor-price difference, do not all respond in the same way.  In the 
most highly polluting activities, only investment from sources similar to the host country, indeed perhaps 
from the source country itself, is deterred by high environmental stringency.  Foreign investment, 
primarily from the United States and Japan, is not deterred by low pollution taxes.  Instead, it appears to 
be attracted to the services or signals that stringency provides about the local investment environment.   
 The economic significance of these results is substantial.  If foreign investment from industrial 
countries provides cleaner technology and seeks rather than avoids locations with high regulatory 
standards, investment by high-income countries in the developing world has the potential to improve 
environmental outcomes in host countries.  A substantial number of research questions remain, such as 
identifying the correct counterfactual for thinking about the effect of FDI on global pollution flows, 
before we can claim that foreign investment is good for the environment.  However, this research suggests 
that there is little evidence for the pollution haven hypothesis--except in highly polluting industrial 
investment from developing countries--and technology differences may help explain why.  
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APPENDIX A 
THE CHINESE POLLUTION LEVY SYSTEM39 
 
 China’s State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) estimates that industrial pollution 
accounts for over 70% of the national total, including 70% of organic water pollution (COD, or chemical 
oxygen demand); 72% of SO2 emissions; and 75% of flue dust (a major component of suspended 
particulates) in 1995.  One of China’s responses to this problem is its pollution charge, or levy system.  
Almost all of China's counties and cities have implemented the levy.  Charges are levied for water and air 
pollution, solid and radioactive waste, and noise. Water pollution charges contribute the largest share of 
the total.  Funds from the pollution levy are used for pollution source control, damage remediation and 
development of environmental institutions.  Despite recognized weaknesses, the Chinese levy system is 
by far the broadest application of price-based pollution control instruments in the developing world. 
The levy system is based on a discharge standard system, and only discharges exceeding the 
standards were subject to a fee before 1993.40  Discharge standards are considered stringent.  In 1993, 
among the 3000 biggest industrial water polluters in China, about 90% were violating the discharge 
standards and, therefore, paying levies. Air pollution emission standards are less stringent than those for 
water pollution and pollutant charge rates are lower. In 1993, only approximately 50% of the biggest air 
polluters violated the emission standards.41 
Under the levy system, polluters report their emissions and local (municipal and county) 
environmental authorities are responsible for verification and collection.  All polluters are required to 
register with local environmental authorities, and to provide information in the following categories: 1) 
basic economic information (sector, major products and raw materials); 2) production process diagrams; 
3) volume of water use and waste water discharge; pollutant concentrations in waste water; 4) waste gas 
volume and air pollutant concentrations (before and after treatment); 5) noise pollution by source; 6) 
                                                 
39 The material in this appendix is drawn from Wang and Wheeler (2005), where additional details can be found.  
40 There is also a standard unit fee for wastewater discharge starting from 1993.  In 1993, a maximum charge of 0.05 
yuan per ton of waste water discharge was announced by the national government. Since 1996, charges have been 
assessed on SO2 (sulfur dioxide) emissions, even if they meet the regulatory standard. Additional proposals for 
reform of the levy system are under study.  
41 Information on polluters is drawn from Wang and Wheeler (2005), who report results of a plant-level survey. 
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discharge of solid wastes; 7) others.  The local environmental authorities check polluters' reports in 
several ways, including internal consistency, consistency with material balance models, historical data 
from the facility, direct monitoring, and surprise inspections.  Penalties are imposed for false reporting 
and for non-cooperation with government inspections.   
The water discharge levy varies by both concentration and volume as it calculates a pollutant-
specific discharge factor, P, based on both total waste water discharge and the degree to which pollutant 
concentration, C, exceeds the standard, Cs.  The precise national levy formula for water discharges is: 
(A1)    
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2
ij sj
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j j ij ij j
ij
j ij ij j
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where for facility i and pollutant j: 
 
Pij = Discharge factor    Di = Total wastewater discharge 
Cij = Pollutant concentration   Csj = Concentration standard 
Wij = Total water levy    W0j = Fixed payment factor 
Tj = Regulatory threshold parameter 
R1 and R2 are charge standards with R2 > R1.  For continuity at Tj, R2jTj=W0j+R1jTj .  When a pollutant 
concentration, C, is less than or equal to the standard, Cs, which is jointly set by the central and local 
governments, a zero charge is made. The charge rate, R, is determined relative to a critical factor, T. Both 
R and T are set by the central government and vary by pollutant but not by industry.   For each polluter, 
the potential levy, Wj, is calculated for each pollutant.  The actual levy is the greatest of the potential 
levies.  Note that the levy formula (A1) implies that the marginal tax rate is lower for firms with discharge 
factors above the threshold amount.   
 The national air pollution levy is implemented in a similar manner to the water levy: the polluter 
is charged only for the highest of the calculated potential levies, Lj.  The levy formula for air pollution is: 
 (A2)  ( )ij j i ij sjA R V C C= −   
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where for facility i and pollutant j: 
 
Rj = Charge rate for pollutant j   Vi = Total volume of air emission 
Cij = Pollutant concentration   Csj = Concentration standard 
Aij = Total levy 
As in the case of water levies, the concentration standard, Cs, is jointly set by the central and local 
government while the charge rate, R, is set by the central government. 
 There are four major sources of provincial variation in pollution tax rates.  First, as noted above, 
concentration standards are set jointly by the national and local governments.  Second, standards differ by 
effluent, thus differences in the concentration of industries across provinces will lead to different effective 
tax rates.  Third, there are significant differences in enforcement capacity at the local level. Finally, the 
levy can be reduced or even eliminated at the discretion of local regulators after appropriate inspections.42  
Such latitude introduces considerable variation into regional enforcement practices.  In general, regulation 
is stricter in areas where incomes are higher, access to information is better, and pollution is heavier.  At 
the provincial level, Wang and Wheeler (2003) show that effective water levy rates are responsive to 
measures of ambient quality and development.  Studying provincial-level averages over an eight year 
period, they find striking changes in water pollution control and environmental performance.  Real 
effective levy rates more than doubled in some provinces and fell in others, while the countrywide 
average increased significantly.  Average air and water pollution intensities fell sharply; they fell most 
rapidly in areas when pollution intensity was initially highest. 
 
 
                                                 
42 The actual levy paid by a firm is the result of bargaining between the government and the firm.  Survey evidence 
suggests that state-owned enterprises pay lower effective rates than privately-owned firms and that levy rates are 
positively related to firm profitability.  For additional detail see Wang, Mamingi, Laplante, and Dasgupta (2003). 
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Appendix B 
Data Definitions and Sources 
 
 
Variable Definition Source 
EJV project data: 
     Location 
     Amount 
     Source 
 
     Industry      
 
Province 
Units: $10,000 
Chinese=Macao, Taiwan, Hong Kong, other South 
Asian countries 
Non-Chinese=all other countries 
3-digit ISIC classification 
Almanac of China's Foreign 
Economic Relations and 
Trade, various years 
Coded by authors 
 
Coded by authors 
Coded by authors 
Levy Total collected water pollution levies/ wastewater 
exceeding standard (yuan/ton) 
China Environmental 
Yearbook, various years 
Skilled labor Percent of population who have a senior secondary 
school education level or above   
China Statistical Yearbook, 
various years, and 
calculations by authors 
Unskilled labor Percent of population who are either illiterate or 
have less than primarily level education 
China Statistical Yearbook,  
various years, and 
calculations by authors 
Semi-skilled labor Percent of population who have primary or junior 
secondary education level 
China Statistical Yearbook,  
various years, and 
calculations by authors 
Cumulative FDI 
value 
Cumulative value of real contracted FDI, from 
1983 until t-1 (in 1980 prices), $million. 
Coughlin, et al. (2000) 
Number of domestic 
enterprises 
Number of industrial enterprises-(number of 
foreign-funded industrial enterprises)-(number of 
Chinese-funded industrial enterprises).  All for the 
township level and above.  ( in thousands) 
China Statistical Yearbook, 
various years 
Telephones Number of year-end urban subscribers/population,  
lagged one year 
China Statistical Yearbook, 
various years 
Incentive Dummy variable for a province with either SEZ or 
Open Coastal City (as of 1996) 
Constructed by authors. 
Roads Highways (km)/land area (km2 ) China Statistical Yearbook, 
various years 
Railroads Railway (km)/land area (km2 ) China Statistical Yearbook, 
various years 
Pollution-Intensity COD (kg)/output (thousand 1990 RMB yuan) 
 
China Environmental 
Yearbook, various years 
Consumption per 
capita 
Consumption (1000 yuan)/population  China Statistical Yearbook, 
various years 
Growth rate of real 
GDP 
Percentage change in annual real industrial output 
(1990 yuan), lagged  one year 
China Statistical Yearbook, 
various years 
Change in State 
Ownership 
Difference between share of industrial output from 
SOEs in year t and t-1. 
China Industrial Yearbook 
Various years 
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Figure 1: Source distribution of JV sample, by province, 1993-1996
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Figure 2: ISIC distribution of JV sample, by province, 1993-1996
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Figure 3: Source Distribution of EJV Sample, by ISIC code, 1993-1996
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    Figure 4A 
 
 
Source:  EJV distribution constructed from the sample EJV data.  Effective pollution levy constructed from dataset 
available at http://www.worldbank.org/nipr/data/china/status.htm. 
     
    Figure 4B 
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Source:  EJV distribution constructed from the sample EJV data. Effective pollution levy constructed from dataset  
available at http://www.worldbank.org/nipr/data/china/status.htm. 
 
 
Table 1.  FDI Inflows into China across Provincial Groups (1987-1995) 
% of TOTAL FDI Inflows 1 
 PROVINCES GROUPED BY: 1987 1992 1995 
Average GDP p.c.2 
High:       >3500 yuan 79 69 64 
Medium: 1500-3500 yuan 12 26 27 
Low:        <1500 yuan 8 5 9 
Average Water Pollution Levy (yuan per ton excess wastewater)3  
High:       >13 yuan 83 78 71 
Medium: 8 - 13 yuan 13 17 22 
Low:        <8 yuan 4 5 6 
Average Discharge Intensity (tons of COD per million 1990 yuan output)4 
High:      >5.5 tons 5 4 7 
Medium: 3.5-5.5 tons 17 28 31 
Low:       <3.5 tons 79 68 62 
1The table reports the sum of FDI inflows actually utilized in each group of provinces, as a % of the total FDI  
actually utilized nationwide in that year.  Note that Hainan and Tibet are excluded due to lack of data. 
Source :  calculated from data available at http://www.worldbank.org/nipr/data/china/status.htm.    
2 High: Beijing, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shanghai, Tianjin, Zhejiang.  Medium: Fujian, Hebei, Heilongjiang,  
Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shandong, Shanxi, Xinjiang.  Low: Anhui, Gansu, Guangxi,  
Guizhou, Henan, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan.    
3High: All high income provinces plus Shandong and Xinjiang.  Medium: Medium income provinces  
(Fujian, Hebei, Heilongjiang,Hubei, Jilin, Shanxi,) and low income provinces (Anhui, Henan, Shaanxi,  and Yunnan).  
Low:  Low income provinces (Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Jiangxi, Sichuan) and middle income provinces (Hunan,  
Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, and Qinghai). 
4 High:  Low income provinces (Anhui, Guangxi, Yunnan), middle income provinces (Hunan, Inner Mongolia,  
Jilin, Xinjiang). Medium:  Medium income provinces (Fujian, Hebei, Heilongjiang,Hubei,Ningxia, Shangdong,  
Shanxi,), low income provinces Henan, Jiangxi, Sichuan) and high income Zhejiang.  Low:  All high income provinces  
(except Zhejiang) plus low income provinces (Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, and Shaanxi).   
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Table 2: Equity Joint Venture Sample, by Province, 1993-1996 
Province 
Number of 
Projects 
Contracted 
Value 
Shares of 
Contract Value 
Utilized 
FDI 
Shares of 
Utilized FDI 
Beijing 248 49787 0.0787 55358.7 0.0808 
Hebei 99 22547.5 0.0356 22430.3 0.0327 
Heilongjiang 62 11201 0.0177 8339 0.0122 
Jiangsu 565 122013.3 0.1929 162205 0.2368 
Jilin 76 13381.4 0.0212 9593.8 0.014 
Liaoning 166 37223.9 0.0588 37875.8 0.0553 
Shandong 400 78368.1 0.1239 73166 0.1068 
Tianjin 68 20830 0.0329 25944.6 0.0379 
Fujian 95 20908.3 0.0331 30247.2 0.0442 
Guangdong 325 86095.4 0.1361 91830.7 0.1341 
Guangxi 36 9816.1 0.0155 9858.3 0.0144 
Hainan 19 4237 0.0067 6495.6 0.0095 
Shanghai 114 40148.3 0.0635 44075.3 0.0643 
Zhejiang 176 31768.4 0.0502 34860.3 0.0509 
Anhui 34 8432.7 0.0133 5200.6 0.0076 
Henan 85 12249.5 0.0194 8357.3 0.0122 
Hubei 41 8360.2 0.0132 7461.8 0.0109 
Hunan 110 23289.1 0.0368 26248.5 0.0383 
Jiangxi 76 9893.4 0.0156 8284.1 0.0121 
Shanxi 8 2542 0.004 1822.4 0.0027 
Gansu 0 0 0 0 0 
Guizhou 6 1182.7 0.0019 437 0.0006 
Inner Mongolia 11 2905.4 0.0046 1812 0.0026 
Ningxia 3 781.4 0.0012 365.7 0.0005 
Qinghai 2 291.1 0.0005 150.5 0.0002 
Shaanxi 27 5677.7 0.009 5734.8 0.0084 
Sichuan 21 5702.7 0.009 5301.9 0.0077 
Tibet 0 0 0 0 0 
Yunnan 8 1973.9 0.0031 1064.1 0.0016 
Xinjiang 5 927.1 0.0015 526.3 0.0008 
SUM 2886 632534.5 1 685047 1 
      
Notes: All the values are in 1990 constant price. 
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Table 3.  Provincial Characteristics:  Period Averages (1993-1996)             
Province 
Cons. p.c.  
(yuan) 
Water Levy 
(yuan/ton) 
Domestic 
Entrepr. 
(000s) 
Cum. Real 
FDI 
Skilled 
Labor (%) 
Unskilled  
Labor  (%) 
Highways 
(km/km2 
area) 
Inland waterway 
(km/km2 area) 
Telephones 
per 000 people
SEZ or 
OCC 
Indus. Output 
from SOE (%)
Beijing 2972 0.22 9.4 1986.7 33 14 0.72 0.000 129.02 1 51
Hebei 1458 0.12 22.7 543.2 9 22 0.27 0.000 20.62 1 38
Heilongjiang 2394 0.11 18.9 419.5 15 18 0.10 0.000 31.87 0 72
Jiangsu 2197 0.17 40.5 4069.9 13 21 0.25 0.233 39.49 1 23
Jilin 2027 0.12 13.2 321.4 18 17 0.15 0.006 37.09 0 65
Liaoning 2573 0.21 29.0 2004.3 14 16 0.29 0.004 41.71 1 49
Shandong 1662 0.18 26.5 2814.5 10 24 0.33 0.012 20.36 1 30
Tianjin 3018 0.33 9.1 1002.4 23 16 0.34 0.007 79.39 1 41
Fujian 2522 0.12 14.3 4347.0 8 28 0.37 0.031 37.76 1 23
Guangdong 3104 0.20 29.2 13862.7 12 22 0.42 0.059 68.98 1 25
Guangxi 1452 0.10 12.9 910.0 8 22 0.17 0.019 11.94 1 50
Hainan 1928 0.14 1.5 1297.1 12 25 0.40 0.009 32.21 1 53
Shanghai 5869 0.20 11.9 3422.1 30 14 0.57 0.317 125.54 1 46
Zhejiang 2478 0.24 36.5 1198.8 9 22 0.34 0.106 47.78 1 19
Anhui 1426 0.12 24.1 338.4 7 30 0.24 0.040 14.05 0 41
Henan 1183 0.10 23.6 431.8 9 24 0.29 0.007 11.53 0 40
Hubei 1745 0.11 23.4 674.8 11 25 0.26 0.042 19.97 0 49
Hunan 1587 0.09 25.6 460.8 9 21 0.27 0.047 16.39 0 48
Jiangxi 1338 0.07 18.4 283.5 8 26 0.20 0.029 12.96 0 50
Shanxi 1430 0.10 11.5 103.7 12 20 0.21 0.001 18.61 0 49
Gansu 1118 0.07 7.2 44.3 10 40 0.08 0.013 15.41 0 72
Guizhou 1070 0.05 7.7 88.1 6 35 0.18 0.010 6.71 0 71
Inner Mongolia 1511 0.08 9.9 77.5 13 23 0.04 0.001 22.76 0 68
Ningxia 1430 0.07 1.8 10.7 11 35 0.16 0.008 23.13 0 74
Qinghai 1539 0.04 1.6 4.8 11 44 0.02 0.000 18.11 0 83
Shaanxi 1274 0.14 13.3 480.2 12 26 0.19 0.005 16.36 0 61
Sichuan 1408 0.06 41.3 735.8 7 25 0.18 0.014 10.75 0 44
Tibet 1127 0.03 0.3 2.0 3 70 0.02 0.000 9.94 0 80
Yunnan 1379 0.10 7.9 109.0 5 35 0.18 0.004 9.14 0 73
Xinjiang 1852 0.14 6.9 66.4 14 25 0.02 0.000 22.16 0 71
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Table 4. Conditional Logit1,2,3  
 Full Sample Chinese  Foreign 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Provincial Variables (in logs) Coeff Z Coeff Z Coeff Z Coeff Z Coeff Z
Levy 0.63** 7.23 0.40** 4.34 0.52** 4.96 0.36* 2.55 0.67** 4.20
Levy*Medium Polluter -0.15 -1.18 -0.15 -0.93 -0.08 -0.41
Levy*High Polluter -0.37** -2.84 -0.50** -2.94 -0.16 -0.79
Local Firms 0.64** 10.25 0.69** 8.89 0.69** 8.9 0.70** 6.95 0.74** 5.76
Agglomeration 0.43** 13.08 0.40** 11.65 0.40** 11.65 0.48** 11.33 0.24** 3.88
Ratio skilled labor     0.92** 8.13 0.81** 4.20 0.83** 4.26 0.51* 2.00 1.41** 4.47
Ratio unskilled labor -0.39* -1.92 0.34 1.46 0.35 1.51 0.41 1.39 0.16 0.43
SEZ or OCC 0.71** 7.97 0.08 0.58 0.08 0.56 -0.33† -1.72 0.50* 2.39
Consumption p.c. -1.04** -6.19 -0.67** -3.33 -0.68** -3.36 -1.06** -4.04 0.22 0.67
Real provincial growth3 2.45** 5.66 0.95* 2.07 0.98* 2.14 0.53 0.89 1.87* 2.46
Telephones -0.56** -4.78 -0.47** -3.88 -0.48** -3.92 -0.31* -2.03 -1.10** -5.23
Roads 0.22** 3.46 0.30** 3.16 0.30** 3.16 0.48** 3.44 0.30* 2.16
Inland navigable waterways 0.13** 8.46 0.09** 5.13 0.09** 5.12 0.12** 5.24 0.06* 2.22
North Coast 0.70** 4.85 0.70** 4.88 0.86** 4.33 0.83** 3.75
South Coast 0.37** 2.12 0.38* 2.19 0.74** 3.13 0.19 0.69
West -0.87** -6.11 -0.87** -6.13 -1.12** -6.04 -0.37† -1.66
   
Obs 80808 80808 80808 47694  32844 
Likelihood  -7959.61 -7902.13 -7898.09 -4677.20  -3130.67 
LR test 3314.27** 3429.22** 3437.31** 2061.74**  1556.02** 
    
 1**, *, and † indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
2 Gansu and Tibet excluded since no foreign investment located there during the time period. 
3 All variables lagged one year. 
4 Three-year moving average.  Not in logs. 
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Table 5.  Nested Logit1,2,3 
 Full Sample Chinese  Foreign 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Provincial Variables (in logs) Coeff Z Coeff Z Coeff Z Coeff Z
Levy 0.53** 7.62 0.54** 7.70 0.28† 1.75 0.49** 3.60
Levy*Medium Polluter -0.02 -1.66 -0.24 -1.37 -0.08 -1.21
Levy*High Polluter 0.00 0.25 -0.57* -2.72 0.05 1.01
Local Firms 0.66** 10.01 0.66** 9.96 0.66** 6.57 0.75** 6.06
Agglomeration 0.44** 13.67 0.44** 13.7 0.49** 11.23 0.24** 4.15
Ratio skilled labor 0.73** 5.93 0.73** 5.82 0.21 0.89 1.19** 4.69
Ratio unskilled labor 0.46* 2.22 0.47* 2.25 0.25 0.88 -0.01 -0.01
SEZ of OCC -0.10 -0.83 -0.10 -0.87 -0.13 -0.74 0.57* 2.77
Consumption p.c. -0.82** -4.40 -0.82** -4.38 -1.08** -3.92 0.26 0.79
Real provincial growth4 0.86* 2.15 0.85* 2.21 0.48 0.72 1.57† 1.83
Telephones -0.34** -3.08 -0.34** -2.96 -0.09 -0.59 -0.93** -4.42
Roads 0.28** 2.98 0.28** 2.98 0.41** 3.01 0.28* 1.90
Inland navigable waterways 0.09** 5.24 0.09** 5.26 0.13** 5.73 0.06* 2.41
Regional Variables  
Average Consumption p.c. 0.88** 3.43 0.85** 3.21 0.94** 4.72 1.24* 2.78
Average Population 0.03 0.87 0.03 0.77 0.02* 1.84 0.06* 2.66
Average Annual Real Growth5 4.60* 2.38 4.69* 2.43 4.37** 3.18 2.67 0.88
IV Parameters  
North Coast 5.62** 2.99 6.15** 2.66 1.20** 4.74 1.09 1.26
South Coast -1.22 -0.83 -1.01 -0.66 0.98** 3.54 0.27 0.30
Inland 0.43 0.34 0.46 0.35 1.08** 4.00 -0.95 -0.56
West 0.39 0.77 0.47 0.86 0.88* 2.51 -1.77 -1.00
         
Obs 80808 80808 47964  32844  
Likelihood  -7871.17 -7869.08 -4667.59  -3121.24  
LR test 3491.14 3495.32 2080.95  1574.88  
LR test:  IV Parameters=1 69.58** 63.88** 8.26†  42.05**  
 1**, *, and † indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
2 Gansu and Tibet excluded since no foreign investment located there during the time period. 
3All variables lagged one year. 4 Three-year moving average.  Not in logs.  5 Not in logs. 
  46
Table 6. Conditional Logit with Correction for State Ownership1,2,3 
 Full Sample Chinese  Foreign 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Provincial Variables (in logs) Coeff Z Coeff Z Coeff Z Coeff Z
Levy 0.19* 2.05 0.30* 2.88 0.17 1.19 0.43* 2.66
Levy*Medium Polluter -0.13 -1.08 -0.14 -0.86 -0.07 -0.35
Levy*High Polluter -0.36* -2.77 -0.48* -2.87 -0.16 -0.78
Local Firms 0.46** 5.78 0.46** 5.78 0.43** 4.20 0.64** 4.58
Agglomeration 0.33** 9.33 0.33** 9.32 0.41** 9.64 0.11† 1.73
Ratio skilled labor 0.61** 3.27 0.62** 3.32 0.19 0.78 1.44** 4.60
Ratio unskilled labor -0.13 -0.52 -0.11 -0.47 0.00 0.00 -0.40 -0.94
Weighted SEZ or OCC4 0.98** 4.48 0.97** 4.44 0.75* 2.54 0.93* 2.75
Weighted Consumption p.c.4 0.45* 1.91 0.45* 1.94 0.26 0.84 1.46** 3.72
Real provincial growth5 1.07* 2.36 1.09* 2.43 0.76 1.31 1.49* 2.01
Change in State Ownership -1.06 -1.47 -1.06 -1.47 -0.92 -0.96 -2.01† -1.76
Telephones -0.76** -6.79 -0.77** -6.87 -0.63** -4.58 -1.38** -6.88
Roads 0.35** 3.97 0.35** 3.98 0.41** 3.24 0.53** 3.83
Inland navigable waterways 0.11** 6.15 0.11** 6.15 0.15** 6.18 0.07* 2.71
North Coast 0.32* 1.98 0.33* 2.03 0.23 1.03 0.92** 3.52
South Coast -0.32† -1.80 -0.31† -1.73 -0.27 -1.12 -0.03 -0.10
West -0.84** -6.02 -0.84** -6.04 -1.16** -6.25 -0.24 -1.14
  
Obs 80808 80808 47694 32844
Likelihood  -7887.39 -7883.57 -4680.93 -3109.465
LR test 3458.70** 3466.35** 2054.27** 1598.42**
  
 1**, *, and † indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
2 Gansu and Tibet excluded since no foreign investment located there during the time period. 
3All variables lagged one year.   
4 Weighted by (1-share of industrial output from SOEs). 
5 Three-year moving average.  Not in logs. 
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Table 7.  Nested Logit with Correction for State Ownership1,2,3 
 Full Sample Chinese  Foreign 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Provincial Variables (in logs) Coeff Z Coeff Z Coeff Z Coeff Z
Levy 0.30** 4.53 0.46** 6.21 0.11 0.63 0.38** 3.20
Levy*Medium Polluter -0.05 -1.44 -0.19 -0.98 -0.05 -1.34
Levy*High Polluter -0.05 -1.56 -0.51† -1.73 0.03 1.01
Local Firms 0.58** 7.95 0.51** 7.10 0.47** 4.36 0.61** 4.55
Agglomeration 0.30** 10.84 0.34** 9.95 0.42** 9.62 0.12* 1.93
Ratio skilled labor 0.90** 7.99 0.73** 4.60 0.06 0.26 1.36** 6.65
Ratio unskilled labor 0.35† 1.79 0.44* 2.24 -0.01 -0.03 -0.64* -1.87
Weighted SEZ of OCC4 0.50** 3.11 0.38* 1.90 0.79* 2.63 0.98** 3.40
Weighted Consumption p.c.4 0.71** 3.71 0.68** 2.90 -0.11 -0.29 1.53** 4.87
Real provincial growth5 0.81* 2.35 1.17* 2.53 0.57 0.91 1.24† 1.82
Change in State Ownership -1.90** -4.34 -1.85* -2.81 -1.55 -1.43 -2.58* -2.15
Telephones -0.97** -10.47 -0.88** -9.28 -0.43** -2.97 -1.38** -8.75
Roads 0.43** 5.37 0.41** 4.60 0.40** 3.15 0.54** 3.83
Inland navigable waterways 0.10** 5.69 0.10** 5.94 0.15** 6.14 0.08** 3.02
Regional Variables  
Average Consumption p.c. 6.58** 3.57 1.21** 3.44 0.65* 2.40 3.76** 3.59
Average Population -0.06 -0.75 0.06* 1.96 0.01 0.33 0.09** 3.51
Average Annual Real Growth6 49.36* 2.33 0.67 0.25 4.53** 3.18 8.39 1.57
IV Parameters  
North Coast -3.03 -1.54 1.47* 3.14 0.93** 4.15 -0.49 -0.66
South Coast -7.03 -2.76 -0.72 -1.52 0.75** 3.08 -2.67* -2.54
Inland -20.05 -2.32 1.69† 1.77 0.96** 3.08 -3.41† -1.77
West -3.65 -3.27 0.29 0.72 0.53 1.25 -2.53* -2.52
  
Obs 80808 80808 47694 32844
Likelihood  -7857.69 -7869.50 -4669.76 -3094.51
LR test 3518.10 3494.48 2076.62 1628.33
LR test:  IV Parameters=1 64.73** 32.34** 6.56 62.38**
 1**, *, and † indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  2 Gansu and Tibet excluded since no foreign investment located there during  
the time period. 3All variables lagged one year.  4 Weighted by (1-share of industrial output from SOEs). 5 Three-year moving average.  Not in logs. 6 Not in logs. 
